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Proposition 36: Ignoring Amenability and Avoiding 
Accountability 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1991 and the implementation of California’s first drug court, 
the state has continued to expand on the idea of rehabilitation for drug-
offenders.1 Over the past ten years California has produced some of the 
nation’s most progressive drug laws.2 One of the most revolutionary 
reforms was implemented by Proposition 36—a “treatment instead of 
incarceration” initiative. This new attempt to rehabilitate minor drug 
offenders appeared promising at first, but it soon became apparent that 
the system was flawed. While the statutory language provided drug 
offenders with needed opportunities to slip-up in their recoveries, it also 
had language indicating that drug offenders needed to show they were 
actually attempting to reform their lives. This clause for amenability has 
since been all but ignored by the criminal justice system and has led to a 
program that lacks accountability on the part of participants. It is no 
wonder then that drug offenders are ultimately unmotivated by this 
current law to complete drug treatment before it is too late and their 
eligibility for such privileges is revoked. Until changes are made—either 
to the language of the law or judicial implementation of the program—
Proposition 36 will continue to function at a sub-par level. 
In November 2000, California voters passed an initiative to provide 
offenders charged with minor drug crimes the option of participating in 
drug treatment programs as part of probation, rather than going to 
prison.3 The initiative, Proposition 36, was titled the “Substance Abuse 
and Crime Prevention Act of 2000,”4 and passed by a decisive 61% of 
 1. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Drug Court Month Proclamation, May 1, 2004, 
http://www.adp.ca.gov/DrugCourts/pdf/DrugCourtsProclamation.pdf (“Drug courts integrate 
criminal justice, treatment services, educational opportunities and community partnerships in a 
collaborative effort to tackle drug and alcohol dependence. Drug courts seek to break the devastating 
cycle of addiction through judicial supervision, substance abuse treatment, and sanctions and 
incentives.”). 
 2. Drug Policy Alliance, Reform in California, http://www.drugpolicy.org/statebystate/ 
california/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
 3. Prop36.org, About Prop 36, http://www.prop36.org/about.html (last visited Dec. 12, 
2006). 
 4. California Campaign for New Drug Policies, Proposition 36: The Substance Abuse and 
Crime Prevention Act, http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). 
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California voters.5
Almost immediately California courts found themselves dealing with 
how to interpret the statutory language of the new voter initiative—
examining such phrases as “washout period,”6 “amenability,”7 and “non 
violent drug possession offenses.”8 The essence of Proposition 36 
seemed clear enough in theory: help rehabilitate drug users and save the 
taxpayers money. But in all practicality, the implementation and 
interpretation of the Act left many Californians wondering if Proposition 
36 really was the magic bullet voters had hoped it would be. 
Part II of this comment addresses the history and purpose of 
Proposition 36. It also summarizes what function the Act fulfills, its 
incorporation into the California Penal Code and the Health and Safety 
Code, and the changes the Act affected on probation of those convicted 
of simple drug offenses. 
Part III of this comment addresses the Act’s discussion of a 
defendant’s amenability to Proposition 36 treatment. It delves more 
specifically into the language of the Act and also discusses the California 
appellate courts’ analysis of Proposition 36. It suggests that although the 
statutory language of the Act is interpreted to apply to a broad range of 
people, the requirements for finding a particular “drug-related” violation 
are construed more strictly than might be imagined at first glance. 
Conversely, once a defendant is placed on Proposition 36 probation, all 
discussion of “amenability” appears to go out the window, and 
California’s tough-love “3 strikes” approach to repeat offenders is all but 
erased. 
Part IV examines recently suggested amendments to Proposition 36, 
specifically in the proposal embodied in Senate Bill 1137. It also 
discusses state sentiment toward Proposition 36’s effectiveness and 
highlights yearly UCLA reports evaluating the Act’s success in treating 
drug offenders. Lastly, it looks at the potential implications this law and 
related legislation may have on other states. 
Part V concludes that the voter intent of Proposition 36, while 
theoretically sound, is in fact construed broadly enough that the Act does 
little more than stall the incarceration of minor9 drug offenders. Even the 
appellate courts’ attempts to “knock sense” into violators by construing 
“drug-related” offenses as narrowly as statutorily permissible does little 
 5. Prop36.org, supra note 3. 
 6. Moore v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. App. 4th 401, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 7. People v. Williams, 106 Cal. App. 4th 694, 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 8. People v. Goldberg, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1207 (Cal. Ct.App. 2003). 
 9. The use of the word “minor” throughout this paper is meant in context of the type of drug 
offense committed⎯not as a reference to the age of the offender. 
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to actually help offenders turn their lives around. The result is that 
despite multiple chances, many offenders are eventually taken off 
probation and put in prison anyway. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  History and Purpose of Proposition 36 
 
In December 1972, the California legislature codified a program in 
sections 1000–1000.4 of the California Penal Code that, in essence, gave 
defendants convicted of certain drug offenses the opportunity to 
rehabilitate rather than go to jail.10 This “diversion program” allowed 
eligible defendants to avoid pleading guilty and instead be diverted and 
referred for “education, treatment, or rehabilitation for a period from six 
months to two years.”11 Once the defendant had satisfactorily completed 
the program the original arrest was deemed not to have occurred.12 
Eventually this program was replaced by deferred entry of judgment13 
where the defendant, after being charged with certain enumerated drug 
offenses, entered a guilty plea, participated in a drug rehabilitation 
program, and would then have the charges dismissed upon successful 
completion of the program.14 Although participation in the drug 
 10. People v. Ormiston, 105 Cal. App. 4th 676, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).  The court further 
stated: 
The purpose of such legislation . . . is two-fold. First, diversion permits the courts to 
identify the experimental or tentative user before he becomes deeply involved with drugs, 
to show him the error of his ways by prompt exposure to educational and counseling 
programs in his own community, and to restore him to productive citizenship without the 
lasting stigma of a criminal conviction. Second, reliance on this quick and inexpensive 
method of disposition, when appropriate, reduces the clogging of the criminal justice 
system by drug abuse prosecutions and thus enables the courts to devote their limited 
time and resources to cases requiring full criminal processing. 
Id. at 689 (citations omitted). 
 11. Id. at 688 (quoting People v. Davis, 79 Cal. App 4th 251, 254 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)). 
Further, courts were authorized to divert defendants who were “formally charged with first-time 
possession of drugs, have not yet gone to trial, and [were] found to be suitable for treatment and 
rehabilitation at the local level.” Id. at 689. 
 12. Id. at 687 (citing Davis, 79 Cal. App. 4th at 254). 
 13. Id. (citing Stats. 1996, ch. 1132, § 2). 
 14. Id. The court further stated: 
The provisions for deferred entry of judgment are available if a defendant satisfies the 
requirements set forth in section 1000, subdivision (a)(1)–(6). The court then must 
determine whether the defendant is suitable for participation pursuant to section 1000.2. 
This requires the court to determine whether the defendant would be ‘benefited’ by the 
deferred entry of judgment procedure. If found suitable, the defendant must waive the 
right to a speedy trial, plead guilty and thereafter participate in a designated program for 
at least 18 months, but no longer than three years. If the defendant fails to perform 
satisfactorily, the prosecutor, the probation officer, or the court on its own motion may 
seek entry of judgment. 
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diversion program served to provide some minor offenders a chance to 
treat their problem and keep their record free of criminal charges,15 there 
was no legislation requiring courts to assign defendants to diversion 
programs. The California legislature enacted the Substance Abuse and 
Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (SACPA), or Proposition 36, on July 1, 
2001,16 in response to this concern, intending that this piece of legislation 
would expand the scheme of treating and rehabilitating first and second 
time non-violent drug possession offenders.17
 
B.  The Function of Proposition 36 
 
The purpose of SACPA was to make communities safer by helping 
drug offenders move toward recovery instead of steering them toward 
overcrowded prisons and to lower taxpayer costs by aiding those 
convicted of simple drug possession or drug use in getting treatment for 
their addictions rather than wasting money incarcerating them.18 The 
Id. (quoting Davis, 79 Cal. App 4th at 255–56 (citations omitted)). 
 15. Id. at 690–91; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000.3, 1000.4(a) (West 2001). 
 16. Drug Policy Alliance, Prop 36: Effective and Popular with Voters, http://www. 
drugpolicy.org/news/06_30_04prop36.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
 17. Prop36.org supra note 3; see also California Campaign for New Drug Policies, Drug 
Courts/Deferred Entry, http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/pdf/drugcourts.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 
2007) (“While this initiative does set up a new process for diversion, it is complementary to the 
established Drug Courts and Deferred Entry programs.”); DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG 
PROGRAMS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2000 FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS, May 21, 2001, http://www.adp.ca.gov/sacpa/pdf/P36_FAQ_Startup.pdf [hereinafter 
SACPA, FAQ]. In response to the question of which defendants will be sent to Penal Code 1000 
programs and which will be sent to treatment services under SACPA: 
Specific criteria are provided in statute to define eligibility for SACPA and for Penal 
Code 1000 (PC 1000), a separate diversion program. While the criteria are similar in 
some respects, they are not identical. Whether a particular person qualifies for one or the 
other depends on several factors. One key difference is that no judgment is entered prior 
to entry into the PC 1000 system; entry of judgment is deferred until after it is determined 
whether the participant successfully completes the program. Under SACPA, a judgment 
of conviction is entered prior to receiving drug treatment services, and the charges and 
conviction may be set aside after successful completion of treatment. Determination as to 
which system a particular person is eligible for or utilizes will be made in the criminal 
justice system. 
Id. at 1. 
 18. 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 36 § 3 “Purpose and Intent” (West) reads: 
The People of the State of California hereby declare their purpose and intent in enacting 
this act to be as follows: 
To divert from incarceration into community-based substance abuse treatment programs 
nonviolent defendants, probationers and parolees charged with simple drug possession or 
drug use offense; 
To halt the wasteful expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars each year on the 
incarceration - - and reincarceration - - of nonviolent drug users who would be better 
served by community-based treatment; and 
To enhance public safety by reducing drug-related crime and preserving jails and prison 
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authors of the Act declared that nonviolent drug offenders who received 
treatment were less likely to abuse drugs and commit future crimes and 
were more likely to lead productive, healthier lives.19 As a condition of 
probation, Proposition 36 also required that recipients of probation 
participate in and complete a drug treatment program.20 The court could 
optionally order them to participate in vocational training, family 
counseling, literacy training, or community service.21 The authors of the 
Act tried, through Proposition 36, to follow the lead of similar legislation 
in Arizona.22 The idea was that safety and health could be promoted and 
taxpayer dollars could be saved23 with legislation that enhanced 
probation for those persons who had a real possibility of being deterred 
early from more serious criminal activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cells for serious and violent offenders, and to improve public health by reducing drug 
abuse and drug dependence through proven and effective drug treatment strategies. 
 19. Id. § 2(a). 
 20. See id.; see also HIGHLIGHTS OF PROPOSITION 36 THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME 
PREVENTION ACT, (Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/drugcourts/documents/ 
highlights.pdf (“Acceptable [drug treatment] programs include one or more of the following: 
outpatient treatment, half-way house treatment, narcotic replacement therapy, drug education or 
prevention courses, and/or limited inpatient or residential drug treatment.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–901.01, Prop 200, § 3, “Purposes and Intent” (West 1956) 
(Among the purposes of Proposition 200 were “to require that non-violent persons convicted of 
personal possession or use of drugs successfully undergo court supervised mandatory drug treatment 
programs and probation” and “to free up space in our prisons to provide room for violent offenders”) 
vacated by State v. Gomez, 127 P.3d 873 (Ariz. 2006), available at http://www.druglibrary. 
org/olsen/medical/azprop200.html; see also Robert L. Gottsfield, Prop 200: Arizona’s Answer to the 
Nonviolent Drug Offender, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Oct. 2002, at 14, 14. 
 23. 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 36 § 2 (West). Findings and Declarations (b)–(c) reads: 
(b) Community safety and health are promoted, and taxpayer dollars are saved, when 
nonviolent persons convicted of drug possession or drug use are provided appropriate 
community-based treatment instead of incarceration 
(c) In 1996, Arizona voters by a 2-1 margin passed the Drug Medicalization, Prevention, 
and Control Act, which diverted nonviolent drug offenders into drug treatment and 
education services rather than incarceration. According to a Report Card prepared by the 
Arizona Supreme Court, the Arizona law: is “resulting in safer communities and more 
substance abusing probationers in recovery,” has already saved the state taxpayers 
millions of dollars, and is helping more than 75 percent of program participants to remain 
drug free. 
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C.  Probation Under the New Act 
 
After California voters approved Proposition 36, portions of it were 
incorporated into the California Penal Code under sections 1210, 1210.1, 
and 3063.1 and into the Health and Safety Code Division 10.8.24 These 
new stipulations on probation effectively allowed minor drug offenders 
more opportunities to violate their probation without having to suffer the 
consequences of prison time.25 This emphasis on a probationary scheme 
that advocated treatment and rehabilitation rather than resorting to 
incarceration was a worthy idea and has, in fact, done good for many 
drug offenders.26 However, without any real consequences for multiple 
drug-related violations, Proposition 36 lacks the ability to hold drug 
offenders accountable and leads to a large number of probationers who 
never complete treatment.27
Though Proposition 36 may seem a more difficult type of probation 
(more conditions and requirements) to endure, the multiple opportunities 
for violation without noticeable consequences eases the offender into a 
penal system of legal breaks and second and third chances, and as 
Californians have discovered: where much is given, little is required (or 
expected). 
 
III.  STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND COURT INTERPRETATION 
 
A.  The Language Itself 
 
The language of Proposition 36 indicated that the purpose of the Act 
was to divert into treatment “those persons whose only offenses were 
nonviolent drug possession offenses.”28 In fact, the language of 
Proposition 36, which was adopted into the California Penal Code, 
 24. See § 1210 (from Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (Proposition 36) 
Section 4); § 1210.1 (from Proposition 36 Section 5); § 3063.1 (from Proposition 36 Section 6); 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE DIV. § 10.8 (West 2001) (from Proposition 36 Section 7). 
 25. Proposition 36 has been cited as a possible shift in public sentiment against a system that 
has a tendency to incarcerate the innocent or impose excessive punishment through the three-strikes 
approach to punishment. Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three 
Strikes’ Overblown Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 286 (2002) (reviewing FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET 
AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001)). In 
fact, in 2001 there was a bill before the California Legislature (A.B. 1652) that “would build on 
Proposition 36 as a way to limit the scope of Three Strikes. It would exempt simple drug possession 
charges from third-strike status. The bill’s author, Jackie Goldberg, highlight[ed] the conflicting tone 
of the two laws, and emphasize[d] the voters’ sentiment that substance abuse requires treatment, not 
incarceration.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 26. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 27. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. 
 28. People v. Goldberg, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
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required that those convicted of nonviolent drug possession offenses 
receive probation.29 Despite presenting clear and straightforward 
definitions for the terms “nonviolent drug possession offense”30 and 
“misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs,”31 the California courts 
soon found themselves facing major statutory language issues, including 
a need to define what constitutes a “drug-related condition” of probation 
and how to properly determine an individual’s amenability to drug 
treatment. 
 
1.  Drug-related conditions of probation keep drug-offenders on 
Proposition 36 
 
Violating a drug-related condition of probation essentially saves the 
defendant from further punishment through incarceration.32 The language 
of the Act (and its subsequent incorporation into Penal Code section 
1201.1) states that once a defendant has been found eligible to participate 
in Proposition 36,33 there is no easy way to revoke probation (and 
 29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(a) (West 2004). 
 30. § 1210(a) defines “non violent drug possession offense” as: 
[T]he unlawful personal use, possession for personal use, or transportation for personal 
use of any controlled substance identified in Section 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057 or 
11058 of the Health and Safety Code, or the offense of being under the influence of a 
controlled substance in violation of Section 11550 of the Health and Safety Code. The 
term . . . does not include the possession for sale, production, or manufacturing of any 
controlled substance and does not include violations of Section 4573.6 or 4573.8. 
Id. 
 31. See, § 1210(d) (clarifying that the term refers to “a misdemeanor that does not involve (1) 
the simple possession or use of drugs or drug paraphernalia, being present where drugs are used, or 
failure to register as a drug offender, or (2) any activity similar to those listed in [paragraph] (1)”). 
 32. A violation of a drug-related condition can include recent drug use, failure to appear at 
treatment, failure to appear in court, noncompliance with treatment or failure to report for drug 
testing. § 1210.1(f)(3)(A)–(B). Additionally, a defendant can also be found to have violated 
probation by: [C]ommitting a nonviolent drug possession offense, or a misdemeanor for simple 
possession or use of drugs or drug paraphernalia, being present where drugs are used, or failure to 
register as a drug offender, or any activity similar to those listed in subdivision (d) of Section 1210. 
Id. 
 33. There are several provisions which disqualify a defendant from Proposition 36 eligibility. 
Section 1210.1(b) reads: 
Subdivision (a) shall not apply to any of the following: 
(1) Any defendant who previously has been convicted of one or more violent or serious 
felonies as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 
1192.7, respectively, unless the nonviolent drug possession offense occurred after a 
period of five years in which the defendant remained free of both prison custody and the 
commission of an offense that results in a felony conviction other than a nonviolent drug 
possession offense, or a misdemeanor conviction involving physical injury or the threat 
of physical injury to another person. 
(2) Any defendant who, in addition to one or more nonviolent drug possession offenses, 
has been convicted in the same proceeding of a misdemeanor not related to the use of 
drugs or any felony. 
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potentially impose jail time) unless it is found that the defendant 
“commit[ed] an offense that is not a nonviolent drug possession offense” 
or that the defendant “violat[ed] a non-drug-related condition of 
probation.”34 In such instances the court has the discretion to reinstate a 
defendant on probation and allow them to continue participating in drug 
treatment.35
When a defendant violates a drug-related condition of probation a 
second time, the court must find that in addition to the violation, the 
defendant is either a danger to others or is unamenable to drug 
treatment.36 It is only when a defendant violates the terms of probation 
three or more times that the court may conduct a hearing to possibly 
revoke the defendant’s Proposition 36 eligibility. Even in such an 
instance of multiple drug violations and reinstatements, the court may 
still allow the defendant to continue on probation (and receive drug 
treatment) if “the defendant is not a danger to the community and would 
benefit from further treatment under subdivision (a)”37 of Penal Code  
 § 1210.1. 
 
2.  Amenability as a way to enforce probationer accountability 
 
Under the language of the Act, the only way to revoke a defendant’s 
participation in Proposition 36 prior to a third or subsequent drug-related 
violation is to find the defendant unamenable to treatment. Although the 
word “amenability” is not specifically defined in the statute, a dictionary 
understanding indicates that a defendant that is amenable is “obedient, 
(3) Any defendant who, while armed with a deadly weapon, with the intent to use the 
same as a deadly weapon, unlawfully possesses or is under the influence of any 
controlled substance identified in Section 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058 of the 
Health and Safety Code. 
(4) Any defendant who refuses drug treatment as a condition of probation. 
(5) Any defendant who has two separate convictions for nonviolent drug possession 
offenses, has participated in two separate courses of drug treatment pursuant to 
subdivision (a), and is found by the court, by clear and convincing evidence, to be 
unamenable to any and all forms of available drug treatment, as defined in subdivision 
(b) of Section 1210. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the trial court shall 
sentence that defendant to 30 days in jail. 
§1210.1(b). 
 34. § 1210.1(f)(2). 
 35. Conversely, if a defendant is found to have violated a non-violent drug-related condition 
of probation, the court is allowed to revoke probation only if “the alleged probation violation is 
proved and the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant poses a danger to 
the safety of others.” §1210.1(f)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Without a clear argument from the state 
that the defendant poses a danger to the safety of others, he or she will be reinstated on Proposition 
36. Id. 
 36. § 1210.1(f)(3)(B). 
 37. § 1210.1(f)(3)(C). 
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tractable”38 and “responsible to authority.”39 While it may seem 
inherently obvious that repeated drug-violations are indicators of a 
defendant’s unamenability to drug treatment, the authors of the Act have 
deemed it appropriate to add the further clarification that amenability 
could be considered separate from probation violations. The California 
Penal Code states that in determining whether a defendant is unamenable 
to drug treatment, the court may consider, to the extent relevant, whether 
the defendant (i) has committed a serious violation of rules at the drug 
treatment program, (ii) has repeatedly committed violations of program 
rules that inhibit the defendant’s ability to function in the program, or 
(iii) has continually refused to participate in the program or asked to be 
removed from the program.40
Thus, although the Act does state that an indicator of unamenability 
is a defendant’s verbal refusal of treatment, the implication is that 
amenability does not turn on a defendant’s words alone. In fact the 
implication is that amenability (or lack thereof) is more apparent in a 
drug offender’s actions (e.g. violating rules of the program, refusing to 
participate, etc.) than in his explicit words (i.e. asking to be removed 
from the program) alone. 
Being amenable cannot even come into play for a court until at least 
the second probation violation hearing.41 It is not until after a defendant 
is in treatment subject to Proposition 36 and has already been through at 
least one hearing process for drug violations (drugs being the very reason 
the defendant was arrested and put on Proposition 36 in the first place) 
that a court may then consider whether that defendant has repeatedly 
violated rules or continually refused to participate in the program in a 
manner that would indicate that the defendant is not amenable.42 The 
question is, then, in a practical setting what disqualifies a defendant from 
Proposition 36 treatment? While it is true that Penal Code § 1210.1 does 
allow the probation department “to move to revoke a probationer who is 
‘unamenable’ to treatment even though normally entitled to mandatory 
probations,”43 that scenario does not often play out in the California court 
system. Indeed, knowing that “it is true that nonviolent drug users don’t 
often get the message until after the first, second or third rehab,”44 what 
does it take for a court to find that a defendant is only using this new 
 38. WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY REVISED EDITION 24 (1996). 
 39. Id. 
 40. § 1210.1(f)(3)(B). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Gottsfield, supra note 22, at 19. 
 44. Id. 
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rehabilitation program to continue his or her drug use as long as possible 
without suffering consequences harsher than re-placement into the same 
program?45
It should be noted that these defendants are eligible for Proposition 
36 because they have committed minor drug offenses. Logically, if they 
are going to violate the terms of their probation, the violation is most 
likely going to be a drug-related one. The legislation accounts for this 
through the amenability clause. The argument here is not that all drug 
offenders are trying to “game” the system—but rather that without 
analyzing amenability there is no way to distinguish between those 
defendants who are struggling to go straight and those who are stalling 
their incarceration in a treatment program that demands no real 
responsibility.46
 
B.  Court Interpretation 
 
While the function of the legislature is to create law, it is left to the 
judiciary to interpret that law and apply it in a practical setting. Though 
Proposition 36 includes language about “drug-related conditions of 
probation” and “amenability” it is up to the courts to determine how they 
will decipher those clauses and apply them to minor drug offenders. Thus 
there is potential for the original intent of voters in passing Proposition 
36 to get lost in court interpretation of the statutory language. 
The Court of Appeals of California, Fifth Appellate District in 
People v. Dagostino47 began with an analysis of Proposition 36 and of 
drug-related conditions of probation within the meaning of Cal. Penal 
Code section 1210.1.48 Here the court focused on the language of Section 
1210.1 to determine both the purpose of Proposition 36 and the standard 
under which the case should be decided. The Dagostino court cited 
People v. Goldberg in finding that the intent of Proposition 36 was to 
“divert into treatment those persons whose only offenses were nonviolent 
drug possession offenses.”49 Thus, defendants who were convicted of 
 45. It should be noted that when a court has found a defendant has violated his or her 
Proposition 36 probation once, twice, or even three or more times, the court “may intensify or alter 
the drug treatment plan” including imposing sanctions “including jail sanctions that may not exceed 
120 hours of continuous custody as a tool to enhance treatment compliance” in the case of a 
violation that does not involve the recent use of drugs. § 1210.1(f)(3)(B). If the violation does 
involve recent drug use (on the first, second or third violation), the court “may order that the 
defendant be confined in a county jail for detoxification purposes only, if the jail offers 
detoxification services, for a period not to exceed 10 days.” Id. 
 46. See discussion infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.4, V. 
 47. 117 Cal. App. 4th 974, 978 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 48. Id. at 986. 
 49. Id. at 986–87 (citing People v. Goldberg, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); 
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such offenses were generally placed on probation until completion of a 
drug treatment program instead of being sent to state prison or county 
jail.50
“Anticipating that drug abusers often initially falter in their 
recovery,”51 the legislature designed Proposition 36 to give offenders 
several chances at probation before allowing a court to impose jail 
time.52 Additionally, Proposition 36 probation was only to be revoked in 
accordance with the terms of the statutory scheme,53 and then only after 
engaging in several motions and hearings.54 This works in favor of the 
drug offender by providing him leeway through imposition of a 
statutorily narrow framework of revocation. 
 
 
 
 
 
People v. Johnson, 114 Cal. App. 4th 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 50. Id. at 987. 
 51. In re Taylor, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1397 (Cal. Ct.App. 2003); See discussion infra Part 
III.B.1. 
 52. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 987. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f)(3)(A)–(C) (West 
2004) reads: 
If a defendant receives probation under subdivision (a), and violates that probation either 
by committing a nonviolent drug possession offense, or a misdemeanor for simple 
possession or use of drugs or drug paraphernalia, being present where drugs are used, or 
failure to register as a drug offender, or any activity similar to those listed in subdivision 
(d) of Section 1210, or by violating a drug-related condition of probation, and the state 
moves to revoke probation, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether 
probation shall be revoked. The trial court shall revoke probation if the alleged probation 
violation is proved and the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant poses a danger to the safety of others. If the court does not revoke probation, it 
may intensify or alter the drug treatment plan . . . 
If defendant receives probation under subdivision (a), and for the second time violates 
that probation either by committing a nonviolent drug possession offense . . . or by 
violating a drug-related condition of probation, and the state moves to revoke probation, 
the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether probation shall be revoked. The 
trial court shall revoke probation if the alleged probation violation is proved and the state 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence either that the defendant poses a danger to the 
safety of others or is unamenable to drug treatment . . . 
If a defendant receives probation under subdivision (a), and for the third or subsequent 
time violates that probation either by committing a nonviolent drug possession offense, or 
by violating a drug-related condition of probation, and the state moves for a third or 
subsequent time to revoke probation, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine 
whether probation shall be revoked. If the alleged probation violation is proved, the 
defendant is not eligible for continued probation under subdivision (a) unless the court 
determines that the defendant is not a danger to the community and would benefit from 
further treatment under subdivision (a). 
 53. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 987. 
 54. Id. at 974. See generally § 1210.1(f)(3)(A)–(F). 
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1.  Drug-related conditions of probation simply mark a probationer’s 
progress through the system 
 
California courts have determined that under Proposition 36 a 
defendant has three chances to violate a drug-related condition of 
probation before the court even regains the discretion to impose jail or 
prison time.55 On the other hand a defendant who is found to have 
violated a non-drug-related condition is eligible for incarceration on the 
first offense.56 In fact, in such a case the defendant “stands in the same 
shoes as any other probationer”57 and is subject to whatever sentencing 
the court chooses to impose—including incarceration or lifting the stay 
on a previously imposed term of incarceration.58 Thus the question of 
whether a violation is drug-related or not is pivotal in determining a 
probationer’s Proposition 36 status. 
 
2.  Statewide application by the courts of the statutory “drug-related” 
conditions 
 
The California court of appeals system is divided into six districts: 
San Francisco, Los Angeles and Ventura, Sacramento, San 
Diego/Riverside/Santa Ana, Fresno, and San Jose.59 Although the 
districts are in place to ensure “that the law is interpreted and applied 
consistently and uniformly,”60 the district courts are not mandatorily 
bound by each others’ decisions or precedent. Although one court’s rule 
may be influential in another district, it will not be mandatory authority. 
That leaves room for slight, but present, discrepancies between courts. 
The findings of seven different courts from four different districts are 
analyzed herein. 
 55. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 987 (citation omitted). 
 56. Id. at 987–88 (under Proposition 36 the first time a probationer violates a non-drug-
related condition of probation, the court has discretion to incarcerate the person; they are not 
extended the same grace as those who violate drug-related conditions). Specifically, CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1210.1(e)(2) states: 
If a defendant receives probation under subdivision (a), and violates that probation either 
by being arrested for an offense that is not a nonviolent drug possession offense, or by 
violating a non-drug-related condition of probation, and the state moves to revoke 
probation, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether probation shall be 
revoked. The court may modify or revoke probation if the alleged violation is proved. 
§ 1210.1(e)(2). 
 57. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 988 (citation omitted). 
 58. Id. 
 59. GovEngine.com, State Courts: California, http://www.govengine.com/statecourts/ 
california.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
 60. California Courts, Courts: Court of Appeals, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/ 
courtsofappeal/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
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a.  The third district. In People v. Dixon, the third district court 
(Sacramento) held that a defendant’s requirement to report to his 
probation officer by mail could not have involved drug testing and did 
not indicate any particular connection to drug problems or drug 
treatment.61 Therefore the court held that it did not have to analyze 
whether the general condition of in-person reporting to a probation 
officer qualified as a non-drug-related condition, because the mail-in 
requirement was clearly not a drug-related condition and Proposition 36 
was properly revoked so the court had the discretion to incarcerate 
Dixon.62 In People v. Davis, the third district court determined that the 
defendant had violated a drug-related condition by failing to submit to 
drug testing or to report to drug court as required by his drug treatment 
regime.63 However, the court determined that since this was the 
defendant’s “first violation of a drug-related condition of probation . . . 
the trial court’s only option was to require defendant to participate in a 
drug treatment program as an additional condition of probation.”64 The 
court argued that Penal Code section 1210.1(e)(3)(D) “must be read to 
override the court’s general discretion to revoke probation”65 given that 
“where reasonably possible, we avoid statutory constructions that render 
particular provisions superfluous or unnecessary.”66 Thus, since a 
defendant can only be taken off Proposition 36 after one violation of 
probation (“one” being construed broadly enough to include a failed drug 
test and two failures to appear in drug court67) if he or she is found to be 
a danger to others,68 a violation of a drug-related condition of probation 
allowed this defendant to continue being treated and avoid incarceration. 
 
b.  The second district. The second district court (Los Angeles and 
Ventura) in In re Taylor ruled comparably, stating that section 1210.1(f) 
“broadly” defines drug-related conditions and that the failure to report to 
a probation officer could be a drug-related condition depending on the 
nature of the meeting.69 It was already clear that the defendant in this 
case had violated drug-related conditions of probation by failing to 
appear for several drug tests and twice testing positive for cocaine. What 
 61. 113 Cal. App. 4th 146, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 62. Id. 
 63. People v. Davis, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 64. Id. at 1449. 
 65. Id. at 1448 (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. (quoting Dix v. Super. Ct., 53 Cal. 3d. 442, 459 (1991)). 
 67. Id. at 1445. 
 68. Id. at 1447; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f)(3)(D) (West 2004). 
 69. 105 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1398 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
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was not clear was whether the defendant’s failure to report to his 
probation officer for a drug test was a drug-related condition.70 If failing 
to report to the probation officer was a non-drug-related condition of 
probation then the court would regain its discretion to incarcerate 
Taylor.71 The court in Taylor acknowledged that there could be many 
reasons an individual is required to report to a probation officer—none of 
which may be drug-related—but in Taylor,  where the defendant was 
reporting for drug testing, his failure to appear “satisfie[d] the definition 
of a drug-related condition of probation.”72
This approach was followed by the Court of Appeals, Third District, 
in People v. Atwood. In Atwood, the court decided that the defendant’s 
failure to attend outpatient counseling and enter treatment was definitely 
a drug-related condition of probation.73 If the defendant’s failure to 
attend four outpatient group sessions and positive test for 
methamphetamine and marijuana were her only violations then the court 
would be bound to reinstate her Proposition 36 probation.74 However, the 
defendant’s failure to keep a scheduled appointment with her probation 
officer could be a drug-related violation depending on the reason for the 
appointment.75 Where the record did not disclose the purpose behind the 
appointment, the court remanded the case back to the trial court to allow 
the prosecution an opportunity to fulfill both the burden of production 
and of persuasion in showing the violation to be non-drug-related.76
 
c.  The fourth district. The fourth district court (San Diego) in People 
v. Johnson held that the defendant’s failure to report to her probation 
officer was not a drug-related condition of probation.77 The court held 
that the defendant’s reliance on Taylor was misplaced and that there was 
no evidence that the defendant’s appointment with the probation officer 
was for drug-testing or any other drug-related reason.78 As a result the 
court excluded the defendant from further Proposition 36 treatment 
stating that “such a result is consistent with the intent and purpose of 
Proposition 36.”79 In this case, although Johnson had violated the 
 70. Id. at 1396. 
 71. Id. at 1398. 
 72. Id. at 1393; see also In re Mehdizadeh, 105 Cal. App. 4th 995, 1001 (2d Dist. 2003) (a 
defendant’s failure to report to his probation officer for drug testing constitutes a drug-related 
condition of probation). 
 73. 110 Cal. App. 4th 805, 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 74. Id. at 808, 810. 
 75. Id. at 811. 
 76. Id. at 813. 
 77. 114 Cal. App. 4th 284, 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 78. Id. at 299. 
 79. Id. at 300. 
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conditions of her Proposition 36 probation a first time by failing to enroll 
in court-ordered drug treatment, failing to complete intake in two 
previous grants of Proposition 36 probation, failing to participate in and 
complete drug treatment,80 and then a second time by again failing to 
enroll in drug treatment,81 it was not those violations that ousted Johnson 
from Proposition 36. It was Johnson’s non-drug related violations that 
rendered her ineligible for further drug treatment.82
 
d.  The first district. Additionally, in People v. Goldberg, the first 
district court (San Francisco), in dictum, stated that a general condition 
requiring the defendant to report to his probation officer was not a drug-
related condition.83 Thus, although Goldberg violated his probation by 
testing positive for methamphetamine, it was not the drug use that caused 
his Proposition 36 probation to be revoked.84
 
e. The fifth district. The fifth district court (Fresno) in Dagostino 
reasoned that, unlike the previously cited cases of Dixon, Goldberg, and 
Johnson,85 defendant Dagostino “was not required to report to the 
‘gatekeeper’ as a general condition of probation.”86 In contrast, 
Dagostino was required to meet with the gatekeeper only for an initial 
evaluation for placement into an appropriate drug treatment program. 
The court also looked more specifically at what constitutes a “drug-
related condition of probation”, stating that according to the statutory 
language a drug-related condition included “a probationer’s specific drug 
 80. Id. at 291. The first revocation and reinstatement of Proposition 36 probation came at a 
March 6 hearing. When Johnson failed to appear in court a bench warrant was issued and on April 
24 Johnson appeared and admitted violating her Proposition 36 probation. The court formally 
revoked that probation but then reinstated it on the same terms and conditions. Id. at 292. 
 81. Id. The second revocation hearing on May 22 alleged that Johnson failed to report to the 
probation department and failed to enroll in court-ordered drug treatment. Johnson failed to appear 
in court on May 22 and later appeared before the court on a bench warrant on July 24. The trial court 
formally revoked Johnson’s Proposition 36 probation. Id. 
 82. Id. at 300. 
 83. 105 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 84. Id. at 1205 (In this case the court determined that “[g]ranting Proposition 36 treatment to 
a probationer who, like Goldberg, was convicted of a crime unrelated to drug possession as well as a 
drug possession offense, would be directly contrary to the purpose of the statute.”). Id. at 1208. The 
court also noted: 
[a]lthough the parties do not address the issue, Goldberg’s probation was revoked not 
only for violation of a drug-related condition . . . but also for failing to report to his 
probation officer. . . . The court should have no less power to redress the violation of a 
non-drug-related probation condition where, as here, the probation was never entitled to 
Proposition 36 treatment in the first place. 
Id. at 1209. 
 85. People v. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th 974, 988 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 86. Id. at 993. 
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treatment regimen, employment, vocational training, educational 
programs, psychological counseling, and family counseling.”87 Thus, the 
court reasoned that reporting to the gatekeeper was Dagostino’s first 
crucial step to placement into a treatment program and that failing to 
meet that requirement was a violation of a drug-related condition of 
probation.88 Since failing to meet with the Mental Health Gatekeeper and 
failing to participate in Proposition 36 treatment programs on two prior 
occasions constituted only the second probation violation, Dagostino was 
once again reinstated on Proposition 36.89
 
3.  The California courts are consistent in their analysis: drug-related 
violations of probation keep offenders on Proposition 36. 
 
The general trend amongst the courts appeared to be that evaluating 
violations as drug-related or non-drug-related depended on the nature of 
the meeting with the authority figure (the most common instance being 
that of probation officers).90 The statutory language of section 1210.1(f) 
suggests that violation of any part of “a probationer’s specific drug 
treatment regimen”91 would constitute a drug-related violation. It follows 
then, that the courts are consistent in their interpretation of the statutory 
language; to them a drug-related violation depends on whether that 
violation is directly related to any part of the course of drug treatment. 
Additionally, in evaluating such drug-related conditions, the 
prosecution has the burden of persuasion and of producing evidence that 
the defendant’s violation “did not involve a drug-related condition of 
probation.”92 Thus, in addition to allowing the defendant some leeway in 
 87. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f) (West 2004)). 
 88. Id. (“The record indicates that appellant [Dagostino] would not be placed in the 
appropriate Proposition 36 program until he met with the ‘gatekeeper,’ who would evaluate his 
circumstances and determine the requisite treatment level.”). 
 89. Id. at 980–81. 
 90. Id. at 989–92 (citing People v. Atwood, 110 Cal. App. 4th 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 
(defendant’s failure to keep an appointment with the probation officer could have been drug related 
but the record failed to state the purpose for the appointment); People v. Johnson, 114 Cal. App. 4th 
284 (4th Dist. 2004) (failing to report to a probation officer was not a drug-related condition); People 
v. Dixon, 113 Cal. App. 4th 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (failing to report by mail was not a drug-
related condition); In re Taylor, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1394 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (failing to appear for a 
drug test is a drug-related condition, but the nature of the defendant’s appointment with the 
probation officer determines whether it is a violation of a drug-related condition); People v. 
Goldberg, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (requiring defendant to report to his 
probation officer was not a drug-related condition); People v. Davis, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2003) (failing to appear in drug court is not a drug-related condition)). 
 91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f) (West 2004) (defines a drug-related conditions of 
probation). 
 92. Atwood, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 812; § 1210.1(f). 
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Proposition 36 through the three (or more) chances rule,93 the court 
system also leans in favor of the defendant by thrusting the burden of 
proof and persuasion on the prosecution and assumes a drug-related 
condition unless shown otherwise. Once the court has determined that 
the defendant violated a drug-related condition of probation, he is to be 
lawfully reinstated on probation pursuant to Proposition 36, unless the 
trial court finds that defendant a danger to others or unamenable to 
treatment.94
 
4.  Amenability ignored 
 
Is the elusive amenability factor harder to prove than drug related 
conditions of probation? Although the courts fairly extensively address 
the question of drug-related conditions of probation and the subsequent 
effects those violations have on probation pursuant to Proposition 36, as 
a general rule the courts decline a discussion on the amenability of the 
defendant to drug treatment. Instead, as in Dagostino,95 the courts may 
mention that a drug offender’s amenability to treatment can affect 
probationary status, but they avoid any definitive analysis as to whether 
or not a particular drug offender (and defendant) is amenable to 
treatment. While such analysis may simply be dropped as a repetitive and 
unnecessary part of the courts’ opinions, it would seem that a precedent 
has been set for Proposition 36 analysis. The courts are simply following 
the general judicial trend of opting to analyze drug possession offenses 
and drug-related conditions of probation rather than discuss amenability. 
Whereas the courts in Atwood, Davis, Goldberg, and Mehdizadeh all 
dealt with first time violations and therefore were not statutorily 
permitted to discuss a defendant’s amenability to Proposition 36, the 
courts in Johnson, Taylor, and Dagostino all dealt with second time 
violations and were properly suited to a discussion on amenability. 
The court in Johnson found that as additional support to their 
conclusion that Proposition 36 was revoked, the record showed that 
“Johnson . . . demonstrated a ‘complete and unequivocal refusal to 
undergo drug treatment,’ thereby rendering herself ineligible for further 
probation under Proposition 36.”96 This statement was made following 
the precedent of People v. Guzman where the defendant Guzman “failed 
to comply with any of the trial court’s directives,”97 including a failure to 
 93. In re Taylor, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 1397. 
 94. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 993. 
 95. Id. at 996. 
 96. People v. Johnson, 114 Cal. App. 4th 284, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 
 97. Id. (citing People v. Guzman, 109 Cal. App. 4th 341, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). 
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report to drug treatment, failure to report to his probation officer and 
appearing in court only on a bench warrant.98 Since both Guzman and 
Johnson had refused drug treatment by not even enrolling in drug 
treatment programs, both were found “not amenable to treatment 
pursuant to Proposition 36.”99 In the case of Johnson, the defendant’s 
unamenability is not the deciding factor in revoking probation but is only 
“support” of the conclusion. 
In Taylor, despite an argument from the state that the trial court 
“implicitly found Taylor was unamenable to further treatment,”100 the 
appellate court stated that because the trial court reinstated Taylor’s 
probation on the same terms and conditions as before (with the exception 
that they tried to also impose jail time), it was evident that the trial court 
did not believe Taylor was unamenable to treatment.101 All discussion of 
amenability ended there. 
Perhaps the lack of amenability analysis is a wise assessment since a 
defendant who has violated a drug-related condition of probation for only 
the second documented time is still eligible for Proposition 36. The court 
seems to take the approach that since the defendant is eligible for 
reinstatement then, naturally, she should be reinstated. However, it seems 
that the voter intent in passing Proposition 36 legislation was, in fact, to 
assess amenability of potential participants and avoid offenders who 
would “burden the drug treatment system.”102 Though amenability seems 
to be treated lightly by the courts—more as a way to ensure that all bases 
are covered than as a necessary element of Proposition 36 analysis—the 
implication in the language of the statute is that amenability is the 
deciding factor once a drug-related condition has been established.103 At 
the very least the language of the statute states that following the 
establishment of two violations of drug-related conditions of probation, 
the state must also prove that the defendant is unamenable to drug 
treatment or is a danger to society.104 Where the statute specifically 
 98. Guzman, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 343. 
 99. Id.; see also Johnson, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 300. 
 100. In re Taylor, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1399 (2d Dist. 2003). 
 101. Id. (“It makes no sense for the court to order continued treatment if the court believed 
Taylor was unamenable.”). 
 102. Moore v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. App. 4th 401, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted). 
 103. See Guzman, 35 Cal. 4th at 585 (“After a second such violation, the mandatory probation 
provision applies unless ‘the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence either that the 
defendant poses a danger to the safety of others or is unamenable to drug treatment.’”) (quoting CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f)(3)(E) (West 2004) (emphasis added)). 
 104. § 1210.1(f)(3)(E) (“The trial court shall revoke probation if the alleged probation 
violation is proved and the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence either that the defendant 
poses a danger to the safety of others or that the defendant is unamenable to drug treatment.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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prescribes the factors relevant to a drug-offender’s eligibility for 
Proposition 36, it would seem that a discussion of a defendant’s 
amenability to such treatment would be a crucial element of a court’s 
analysis—especially in light of the court’s role—namely, to “ascertain 
and declare what is in the terms and substance of a statute.”105 Thus, 
while it is not the function of the appellate court to introduce new 
elements or make new arguments, in Taylor and Dagostino the courts 
had the opportunity to discuss the arguments made by the state (that the 
defendants were unamenable to treatment) and yet declined to go into 
any depth as to what constitutes amenability and why it did not apply in 
those respective cases. 
It would have been helpful in the case of Taylor or Dagostino if the 
court had discussed what factors or evidences are at play in determining 
a defendant’s amenability to drug treatment. The implication, given that 
the courts did not find Taylor nor Dagostino unamenable, is that even 
multiple instances of failed drug tests, missed meetings, and broken 
commitments do not render a defendant “unamenable” despite “minimal 
effort on the first [Proposition 36] opportunity and no effort on the 
second.”106 If it is possible to be placed on Proposition 36 and avoid jail 
time while showing a complete disregard for the rules and requirements 
of Proposition 36 by failing to report to the probation department, 
repeatedly testing positive for the very drug one was charged with 
possessing when initially arrested, failing to appear for required drug 
tests, and missing counseling sessions,107 then the question is what does 
make a defendant unamenable? 
A possible answer lies in Guzman, where the court found that the 
“the trial court can terminate the probation of a defendant who, by his 
conduct following the grant of probation refuses to undergo 
treatment.”108 However the court makes it clear that “[s]uch a defendant 
 105. People v. Foreman, 126 Cal. App. 4th 338, 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 106. People v. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th 974, 981 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (After being given 
two opportunities to participate in treatment and failing both chances, “[t]he probation officer 
concluded appellant was ‘unamenable to treatment at this time,’ and recommended his exclusion 
from further treatment”). 
 107. Id. at 980–82. 
 108. 109 Cal. App. 4th at 349–50. The court stated: 
In this case, defendant made no effort whatsoever to comply with his drug treatment 
probation. He instead absconded from the jurisdiction of the trial court by leaving the 
United States. Moreover, regardless of his reasons for doing so, upon his return to this 
country, he did not report voluntarily to his probation officer, the drug treatment center or 
the trial court. He persisted, rather, in disregarding the trial court’s orders and the 
requirements accompanying his grant of probation pursuant to Proposition 36. Hence, 
this is not a case in which a defendant commences drug treatment and falters. This is not 
a case in which a defendant responded to a family emergency and then voluntarily 
reported to his probation officer for supervision or the drug treatment center for 
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is to be distinguished from a defendant who commences drug treatment 
and thereafter falters by violating conditions of probation. The 
transgressions of such a defendant would be analyzed as probation 
violations pursuant to section 1210.1, subdivision (e).”109 Thus, although 
in this instance the court found the defendant unamenable, and therefore 
ineligible for continued Proposition 36 probation, the court explicitly 
states that this finding is unique to those defendants who never even start 
treatment.110
Indeed the courts as a whole111 continue to fail to explore the purpose 
of the amenability clause. If the interpretation is to be so broadly 
construed that a defendant “must be found unamenable to ‘any and all 
forms of treatment’ before he or she may be excluded under this 
[amenability] provision,”112 then what is the purpose of including it in the 
language of the statute? The courts seem intent on following the will of 
the voters in enacting the Proposition 36 legislation when it comes to the 
plain language of drug-related violations and yet fail to consider what 
purpose the electorate may have envisioned in stating that defendants 
must also be “amenable” to treatment in order to stay on Proposition 36. 
Until amenability is included in the analysis of a probationer’s 
Proposition 36 eligibility, the Act will have no way of imposing on drug-
offenders a sense of accountability. 
 
 
 
 
 
treatment. This is a case in which defendant, by his acts and omissions, evinced a 
complete and unequivocal refusal to undergo drug treatment. 
Id. 
 109. Id. See  § 1210.1(f). 
 110. Guzman, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 349–50. 
 111. The exception being Guzman, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 341 (as discussed supra Part III.B.4). 
 112. Gregory A. Forest, Comment, Proposition 36 Eligibility: Are Courts and Prosecutors 
Following or Frustrating the Will of Voters?, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 660 (2005). See People v. 
Tanner, 129 Cal. App. 4th 223, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), where the appellate court found that the 
trial court erred in revoking defendant’s probation based on the sheer number of drug related 
probations. Although the trial court minutes state that Tanner was unamenable to Penal Code 1210.1 
treatment, the oral pronouncement of the court showed that the court: 
did not reach the issue of amenability because it had already revoked Tanner’s probation 
based on his admissions to a third and fourth violation of drug-related conditions of his 
probation under the Act. . . . Although there are statements in the probation report that 
could support a court finding Tanner was unamenable to treatment under the Act, there 
are also statements supporting Tanner’s continued attempts for further treatment. Thus, 
on this record we cannot find the trial court even impliedly found Tanner was 
unamenable to drug treatment under the Act. 
Id. at 237. 
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IV.  EVALUATION AND AMENDMENTS 
 
A.  Six Years Later 
 
After six years of implementation, the legislature has taken on the 
task of evaluating the effectiveness of Proposition 36 in treating drug 
offenders and deciding if the program merits further funding and what, if 
any, changes should be made. When Proposition 36 went into effect in 
July of 2001, the state allocated $120 million annually for treatment 
services up until July of 2006. When the initial funding ran out it was up 
to the legislature to decide how to continue to fund the program.113 
Despite a touting of the Act’s success by pro-Proposition 36 groups, 
requests for budgetary expansion were denied and funding continued at 
the same rate.114 In fact, the “success” of Proposition 36 really depends 
on who you ask and what statistics they are choosing to cite. For 
example, pro-Proposition 36 groups point out that over 35,000 people 
enter treatment each year and after six years of the program running 
“over 150,000 people benefited from Prop 36 treatment and California 
taxpayers saved about $1.3 billion.”115 But on the other hand, anti-
Proposition groups will argue that Proposition 36 has been a failure, 
because “the failure rate of people sent to Proposition 36 programs 
exceeds 75% (worse than California’s felony recidivism percentages).”116
According to the initial UCLA report on the Act covering 
implementation of Proposition 36 through June 2002, studies “suggest 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. In an effort to amend certain provisions of Proposition 36 the legislature enacted S.B. 
1137 in which they approved increasing the current funding of $120 million a year to $145 million a 
year. Laura Mecoy, Drug Policy Alliance Files Suit to Protect Prop 36, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jun. 29, 
2006, available at http://realcostofprisons.org/blog/archives/2006/06/drug_policy_all.html. Despite 
the offer for increased funding (with the accompanying provisional changes), drug treatment 
program administrators and providers stated that they would need $209.3 million to adequately fund 
Proposition 36. Id. S.B. 1137 never came to fruition. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 115. Prop36.org, supra note 3. 
 116. California Narcotics Officers’ Association, What’s New at CNOA, http://www.cnoa.org/ 
whats-new-7-1-06.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2007) [hereinafter CNOA]. What is meant by “failure” is 
not discussed further in this article. However, according to the California Department of Alcohol and 
Drug Programs, 
SACPA defines ‘successful completion of treatment’ to mean that the defendant ‘. . . has 
completed the prescribed course of drug treatment and, as a result, there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the defendant will not abuse controlled substances in the future.’ 
The treatment community recognizes that relapse is a common feature of addiction. 
Indeed, relapse—a return to addictive behavior—may sometimes be a step (or misstep) 
on the path to recovery, rather than a failure. It is not uncommon for an individual to 
alternate between treatment and relapse before completely recovering. The Department 
anticipates that treatment success will be further defined at the local level. 
SACPA, FAQ, supra note 17, at 5. 
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that 90 days may be a minimum threshold for effective treatment,”117 and 
yet while 65.1% of outpatient drug-free “clients” received at least 90 
days of treatment, only 42.8% of long-term residential clients received 
90 days of treatment.118 The study does not say how many of those who 
made it through at least 90 days of treatment were then successful in 
avoiding relapses and reappearances in court for probation violations. 
The implication is that despite the availability of this new “public health 
approach toward handling drug offenders,”119 when only 42.8% of drug 
addicts are even making it 90 days, even fewer are finding any true help 
in the program. 
Perhaps, though, the voter intent in enacting Proposition 36 was not 
to help “most people,” but only to help someone. The UCLA 2002 
Report also pointed out that the first year of the Act a total of 53,697 
defendants were found to be eligible for Proposition 36 treatment, and 
82% of them chose to participate.120 Of those who chose to participate in 
the treatment, only 69% actually entered treatment.121 Perhaps most 
significant in that report was the finding that “[t]reatment duration was 
similar among SACPA clients and non-SACPA clients.”122 Thus, one 
could surmise that being placed on Proposition 36 by the court really 
does not make much of a difference in treatment from those drug addicts 
who choose to be treated of their own accord; until drug offenders want 
to be treated no system is going to help them get better and stay out of 
prison.123
 117. UCLA EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT 2002 
REPORT 39(2003), available at http://www.csdp.org/research/prop36_rpt1.pdf [hereinafter UCLA 
REPORT 2002]. While UCLA has conducted yearly evaluation reports on SACPA, the reports focus 
more on “analyses of cost-offset, client outcomes, implementation, and lessons learned” and less on 
the courts’ functional interpretation of Proposition 36. Id. at 3. Consequently the UCLA results are 
not discussed in depth in this comment. 
 118. Id. at 42 (“[O]ver 90% of SACPA [Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act] 
treatment clients were placed in outpatient drug-free and long-term residential treatment.”). 
 119. Prop36.org, supra note 3. 
 120. UCLA REPORT 2002, supra note 117, at 8. 
 121. Id. (“Among offenders who chose SACPA, 85% (37,495) completed assessment, and 
81% (30,469) of assessed offenders entered treatment. Overall, 69% of offenders who opted for 
SACPA in court entered treatment.”). 
 122. Id. The only real distinction between SACPA clients and non-SACPA clients is that 
SACPA clients are those individuals who qualify for Proposition 36 treatment based on the statutory 
language of California Penal Code §§ 1210 and 1210.1 and who choose to participate in the 
program. Id. at 9-10. 
 123. See also DOUGLAS LONGSHORE ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND 
CRIME PREVENTION ACT 2004 REPORT iii-iv (2005), available at http://www.uclaisap.org/Prop36/ 
documents/sacpa080405.pdf [hereinafter UCLA REPORT 2004]. Regarding the similarity between 
SACPA offenders and non-SACPA drug users: 
Overall, about one-quarter (24.9%) of offenders who agreed to participate in SACPA in 
its second year completed treatment (based on a 72.6% treatment entry rate among all 
SACPA offenders and a 34.3% completion rate among offenders who entered treatment). 
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The statistics for the success of the Act become even bleaker as time 
goes on. In UCLA’s 2004 Report, only about one-third of offenders 
(34.3%) who entered Proposition 36 treatment in the second year of the 
Act went on to complete treatment.124 In fact, “[o]verall, about one-
quarter (24.9%) of offenders who agreed to participate in SACPA in its 
second year completed treatment.”125 The implication, again, is that 
although the Act is helping some people, most drug offenders are placed 
on Proposition 36 with little motivation to actually get better. As a result, 
in its third year of implementation, over one in five Proposition 36 
probationers eventually have their probation revoked.126 That means that, 
given the multiple chances and violation hearings in court, a significant 
number of probationers play out all their options and end up incarcerated 
anyway. It cannot be denied that Proposition 36 has helped some 
offenders, but the fact that so many do not complete treatment and a fair 
number eventually have their probation revoked indicates that the system 
is not working the way California voters initially envisioned.127
As a “ground-breaking” model for other states, the success or failure 
of Proposition 36 has the potential to set the standard for a “treatment-
instead-of-incarceration” program on a state-wide and even national 
level.128 According to a recent survey, 63% of Americans consider drug 
abuse “a problem that should be addressed primarily through counseling 
and treatment, rather than the criminal justice system.”129 Thus many 
This rate is typical of drug users referred to treatment by criminal justice. 
Id. Additionally there appears to be no difference in cost between SACPA clients and non-SACPA: 
State statutes enacted prior to SACPA require drug treatment programs (except Drug 
Medi-Cal) to assess fees toward the cost of treatment based on the client’s ability to pay 
in accordance with state statute. Such fees are to be deducted from the program’s cost of 
providing services. Under the regulations implementing SACPA, counties are required to 
use fees assessed by trial judges toward the costs of placement. Placement costs include 
court or probation department costs to ensure a client is enrolled in drug treatment. 
SACPA, FAQ, supra note 17, at 2. 
 124. UCLA REPORT 2004, supra note 123, at iii (“The completion rate was about the same 
(34.4%) in SACPA’s first year.”). 
 125. Id. at iv (these statistics are “based on a 72.6% treatment entry rate among all SACPA 
offenders and a 34.3% completion rate among offenders who entered treatment”). 
 126. Id. at v. 
 127. Given the language of the original text for the Proposition 36 Ballot Initiative, it is not a 
stretch to think that voters had high hopes for the success of the proposition in rehabilitating drug 
offenders, saving money by avoiding incarceration, and reducing drug-related crime. See supra note 
23 and accompanying text. 
 128. Drug Policy Alliance, Reform in California, http://www.drugpolicy.org/statebystate/ 
california/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2007); see also Prop36.org, Addressing Your State’s Budget Crisis: 
Treatment Instead of Incarceration, http://www.prop36.org/treatment_instead.html (Maryland has 
passed a new treatment law diverting several thousand prisoners into drug treatment; New York 
governor announced a plan to divert nonviolent drug offenders to drug treatment over a three year 
period, but the legislature denied it). 
 129. Prop36.org, supra note 3(citing to a survey conducted by Open Society Institute, 
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states are watching California’s Proposition 36, as well as Arizona’s 
similar statute ,130 to see how these new drug laws will work and if they 
are worth emulating.131
The effectiveness of Proposition 36 in rehabilitating minor drug 
offenders hinges on the courts’ functional interpretation of the statutory 
language, and in their effort to decipher voter intent. Although there are 
many reasons a drug offender might not complete treatment (and 
therefore seem a “failure” to Proposition 36132), many of the 
effectiveness issues could be worked out if the courts were willing to 
address amenability and distinguish between those offenders struggling 
to overcome their addictions and those working the system for as long as 
statutorily allowed. The courts’ Proposition 36 decisions will not only 
affect those who stand before them, but more importantly in light of new 
and pending legislation in California, they will also affect the direction in 
which the program will go from here.133
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changing Attitudes Toward the Criminal Justice System). 
 130. Arizona’s Proposition 200, the Drug Medicalization Prevention and Control Act of 1996, 
was also implemented to send first and second time non-violent drug offenders to treatment instead 
of prison. See id. A recent report conducted by the Supreme Court of Arizona found that Proposition 
200 saved Arizona taxpayers $6.7 million in 1999 and 62% of probationers successfully completed 
their court ordered drug treatment. Id. 
 131. Tamara Karel, The Failure of Ohio’s Drug Treatment Initiative, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
203, 234 (2004) states: 
Ohio would be well served to sit back and watch the laws of Arizona and California in 
place. Ohio legislators and judges would benefit from seeing these laws in action, 
observing the flaws and strengths of drug treatment probation for first and second-time 
offenders. The General Assembly can then make decisions based on educated facts and 
data. . . . Next time, it should be done as a law rather than a constitutional amendment. 
See also Prop36.org, supra note 3 (two states, Maryland and New York have also recently tried 
implementation of like programs: 
Maryland’s new treatment law immediately diverts several thousand prisoners into drug 
treatment, saving the state’s taxpayers millions of dollars a year in the process. It also 
provides $3 million in additional funding for treatment and gives judges new discretion in 
sentencing. 
New York state recently announced that three planned prison closings, made possible by 
the state shifting almost 7,000 nonviolent drug offenders from prison to drug treatment 
over a three-year period, will save the state a projected $18 million. 
Unfortunately the announcement was premature. This move was proposed by the 
Governor, but denied by the legislature.). 
 132. See supra note 116. 
 133. Prop36.org, supra note 3. 
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B.  California Senate Bill 1137 
 
Because of concerns with the effectiveness of Proposition 36, the 
California legislature “overwhelmingly approved”134 Senate Bill No. 
1137 (S.B. 1137), authored by Senator Denise Ducheny, in 2006.135 S.B. 
1137 amended Proposition 36 to give judges more discretion when they 
were sentencing repeat offenders, including “discretion to send relapsing 
offenders to jail for ‘flash incarcerations’ for up to five days.”136 The 
legislature declared that their purpose in enacting S.B. 1137 was to 
“improve outcomes and promote accountability consistent with the act 
and to further the purposes of the act.”137 The bill laid out several reforms 
including: closer judicial monitoring and collaboration with probation 
and treatment centers; greater judicial discretion to provide offenders 
with more opportunities after a third drug-related violation; hearings to 
remove offenders after a first offense who will not benefit from 
treatment; brief jail sanctions; and mandated drug testing. All of this 
having the intent to “enhance accountability,” “assure accountability,” 
“improve offender outcomes,” and provide “a motivational tool to 
improve the number of defendants who enter treatment, remain in 
treatment, and complete treatment and probation consistent with the 
purposes of the act.”138 Ducheny stated that with the enactment of these 
 134. CNOA, supra note 116. 
 135. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 63, S.B. 1137 (West); see also Open Minds Industry 
Resources Library, California Senate Bill No. 1137, http://www.openminds.com/indres/CAsb_1137. 
htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); CNOA, supra note 116. 
 136. Lisa Richardson, Jail Provision Angers Drug Reform Advocates, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 29, 
2006 at 4. The bill provides changing the wording of Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1(f)(3)(A), which 
refers to defendants who are shown to have violated a drug-related condition of probation once, to 
include that “the court may impose sanctions including jail sanctions that may not exceed 48 hours 
of continuous custody as a tool to enhance treatment compliance.” 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 63, 
S.B. 1137 (West). On a second violation the bill changes the wording of Cal. Penal Code § 
1210.1(f)(3)(B) to include the court’s ability to “impose sanctions including jail sanctions that may 
not exceed 120 hours of continuous custody as a tool to enhance treatment compliance.” Id. On a 
third or subsequent violation the bill would change Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1(f)(3)(C) to add that 
“the court may impose appropriate sanctions including jail sanctions as the court deems 
appropriate.” Id. 
 137. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 63, S.B. 1137, § 1(j)(1) (West). 
 138. Id. at § 1(j)(1)–(5). The bill also lists in the Legislative Council’s Digest reforms in terms 
of what the act says and how S.B. 1137 would change that, stating: 
The act defines “successful completion of treatment” as a defendant who has completed 
the prescribed course of treatment and, as a result, there is reasonable cause to believe 
that the defendant will not abuse controlled substances in the future 
This bill would instead define “successful completion of treatment” as a defendant who 
has completed the prescribed course of treatment. Completion of treatment would not 
mean cessation of narcotic replacement. . . . 
This bill would require drug testing as a condition of probation. The bill would require a 
person subject to the act to be monitored by the court, as specified. . . . 
Under the act, if a defendant violates probation, as specified, the court may revoke 
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new provisions, the legislature’s “intention is not to punish, but to give 
judges tools to encourage successful treatment. That’s what California 
voters wanted.”139
Despite the legislature’s finding that the pre-S.B. 1137 form of 
Proposition 36 was lacking140, some groups were unhappy with these 
attempts to reform the law.141 In fact, the Drug Policy Alliance argued 
probation or it may intensify or alter the drug treatment plan. 
This bill would authorize a court to also order incarceration for a specified period, in 
order to enhance treatment compliance, and in some circumstances, to order the 
defendant to enter a residential drug treatment program, if available, or be placed in a 
county jail for not more than 10 days for detoxification purposes only. 
 139. Evan Halper, Judge Bars Tougher Drug Rehab Law, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at 3. 
Many judges, district attorneys, public defenders, probation officers and law enforcement agencies 
have been critical of Proposition 36 since its enactment and have been lobbying for change for years. 
Richardson, supra note 136, at 4. Ducheny was also quoted as saying in reference to S.B. 1137, 
“[f]undamentally, this is not giving them jail time for the drug offense but to say, ‘Look, we gave 
you that opportunity and you decided, for whatever reason, not to take advantage of it . . . You didn’t 
meet your responsibility to us, so we need some accountability.’” Id. 
 140. S.B. 1137 § 1(e)–(g) reads: 
(e) The UCLA evaluations have found that approximately 30 percent of referred SACPA 
offenders do not enter treatment. Judicial monitoring, through dedicated court calendars, 
collaboration and coordination between the courts, probation and treatment, as 
demonstrated by drug courts, would enhance entry, retention, and completion of 
treatment by offenders. 
(f) The UCLA evaluations have found that 34 percent of those who do in fact enter 
treatment complete that treatment. This completion rate, as well as retention rates, can be 
improved through the enhancement of compliance with treatment, as well as tailoring 
treatment to the needs of offenders following drug-related violations of probation to 
assure that the level and duration of treatment they are assessed or reassessed to 
overcome addiction, including detoxification and residential services, are provided, and 
that treatment be of sufficient duration to meet individual needs of defendants. 
(g) SACPA does not specifically address the use of short periods of jail time as a 
motivational tool to hold SACPA offenders accountable to enter and stay in treatment. 
Studies have reported that drug court clients were more likely to enter treatment, 
remained in treatment significantly longer, and engaged in significantly less drug use 
when they received swift and sure sanctions and rewards, including the possibility of 
brief periods of jail time during the course of treatment. Therefore, sanctions including 
short periods of jail time for relapsing, problematic, or recalcitrant offenders, on a 
showing of need after consideration of important treatment and other factors, should be 
available, not as a substitute for treatment but as a tool to motivate and hold offenders 
accountable. 
2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 63, S.B. 1137, §1(e)–(g) (West). 
 141. Frank D. Russo, Judge Upholds Vote of Californians on Prop 36 Drug Courts Against 
Schwarzenegger Demanded Legislative Changes, CALIFORNIA PROGRESS REPORT, available at 
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2006/09/judge_upholds_v.html (“Unless the Governor just 
doesn’t know what he is doing here, you can only conclude that he has no respect for the vote of the 
electorate on Prop 36. If he wanted to change the Proposition into something that the electorate did 
not vote for, he has to go back to the people. He didn’t do that here.”); Dave Fratello, Jail Won’t 
Cure Drug Users, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2006, at 11 (“last week the governor signed a misguided bill 
that puts jail back into the equation. . . . [M]ore than 60,000 people have graduated from drug 
treatment, meaning the program is saving lives, not just money. With this track record of success, the 
Legislature picked a strange time to rewrite Proposition 36.”); Laura Mecoy, Drug Policy Alliance 
Files Suit to Protect Prop 36, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jun. 29, 2006, available at 
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that the revised provisions resulted in “[f]ive years of work defeated by 
secretive backroom process in the Legislature.”142
Hours after Governor Schwarzenegger signed the changes in S.B. 
1137 into law, Cliff Gardner (the official ballot proponent of Proposition 
36), the Drug Policy Alliance, and the California Society of Addiction 
Medicine filed suit against Governor Schwarzenegger. Opponents of 
S.B. 1137 alleged that the proposed changes would radically alter 
Proposition 36 against the voters’ initial intent in enacting the Act and 
that the attempt to change Proposition 36 was unconstitutional.143 
Alameda County Superior Court Judge Winifred Smith issued a 
temporary restraining order to keep S.B. 1137 from going into effect and 
later entered a preliminary injunction against the Proposition 36 
alterations while the court looked into the constitutionality issues.144 
Thus, at present, S.B. 1137 has not taken effect and Proposition 36 
continues in its original form. 
 
C.  Future Implications 
 
Since S.B. 1137 has been blocked from implementation since July 
2006,145 the ability of Proposition 36 to enforce any sort of accountability 
rests squarely on the shoulders of the amenability clause. The Supreme 
Court of California stated in People v. Canty that a reasonable 
interpretation of the enacting body’s intent in passing Proposition 36 may 
be evidenced not only in the statutory language itself, but also in the 
history and background of the Act.146 Further, the court stated that 
consideration should also be given to uncodified findings and statements 
http://realcostofprisons.org/blog/archives/2006/06/drug_policy_all.html (“The legislation’s goal is to 
compel offenders to stay drug-free. But Proposition 36’s authors contend additional treatment is the 
answer – not jail. ‘Jail is not part of treatment,’ said Margaret Dooley, Drug Policy Alliance 
Proposition 36 outreach coordinator. ‘It doesn’t help people stop using drugs. If it did, we wouldn’t 
have a recidivism problem.’”); see also Prop36.org, Prop 36 In the News, 
http://www.prop36.org/news.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) (lists various Pro-Proposition 36 
articles). 
 142. Richardson, supra note 136, at 4 (quoting Bill Zimmerman, the political consultant who 
managed the campaign for Proposition 36). 
 143. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 7, Gardner v. Schwarzenegger (Cal. 
Super. Ct. July 12, 2006); see also Drug Policy Alliance, http://www.drugpolicy.org/law/ 
treatmentvsi/. 
 144. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Gardner et al. v. Schwarzenegger et al., RG06-
278911 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2006); see also Drug Policy Alliance, Cliff Gardner et al. v. 
Schwarzenegger et al., http://www.drugpolicy.org/law/treatmentvsi/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2007); see 
also Judge Extends Block to Changes for Drug Treatment Law, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, 
available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/state/20060914-2303-ca-schwarzenegger-
drugtreatment.html. 
 145. Open Minds Industry Resources Library, supra note 135. 
 146. 90 P.3d 1168, 1175 (Cal. 2004). 
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of intent as presented to the voters.147 With Proposition 36, the legislature 
adopted several uncodified findings and declarations in order to garner 
voter endorsement—among those a concern for public health and safety 
and a more efficient expenditure of taxpayer funds by treating minor 
drug offenders instead of spending money to incarcerate and re-
incarcerate them.148 Given these objectives and the built in “chances” of 
Proposition 36 (similar to the three-strikes rule, defendants are given 
three drug-related violation probations before they are even eligible for 
jail time or elimination from the Proposition 36 program149) it would 
seem that the intent of Proposition 36 is a broad desire to rehabilitate 
minor drug offenders. 
If it is the intent of the voters to improve society at large through 
alternative drug treatment measures, then is Proposition 36 in place to 
include as many people as controllable with as much leeway as possible 
while still maintaining a semblance of order in the court system? Or is 
there any concern for the encouragement of members of society to show 
some accountability for their actions? The California courts seem to 
indicate that the statutory scheme (and thereby the intent of voters) is one 
of inclusion: defendants participating in Proposition 36 probation, 
despite multiple violations thereof,150 can only have that probation 
revoked under a narrow set of conditions.151
Previous courts have determined that “Proposition 36 should not be 
interpreted to frustrate the intent of the electorate. . . . An interpretation 
that renders related provisions nugatory must be avoided . . . ; and if a 
statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to 
the more reasonable result will be followed.”152 Given this understanding 
of the purpose of the Act and of the amenability language, it seems that 
the courts neglected to take into account the electorate’s intent to factor 
in a probationer’s accountability, responsibility, and compliance with a 
program that offers them an alternative to prison. In those instances 
where a defendant has not demonstrated a willingness to proactively 
participate in Proposition 36 and be rehabilitated, a court should be open 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f)(3)(F) (West 2004). 
 150. People v. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th 974 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). The court includes 
Dagostino’s discharge from the Desert Counseling Clinic for poor attendance, failure to report to the 
probation department, repeated positive marijuana tests, failures to appear for drug tests and missed 
appointments as one probation violation. Id. at 979. 
 151. Id. “Proposition 36 supersedes the trial court’s general power to revoke probation under 
sections 1203.2 and 1203.3” and can only be annulled by a non-drug-related violation of probation 
or after the defendant has been convicted of a third drug-related violation. Id. at 995. 
 152. People v. Glasper, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1104, 1114 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)(citations omitted). 
  
531] PROPOSITION 36: AVOIDING ACCOUNTABILITY 559 
 
to a discussion on what makes that defendant remain yet amenable to 
treatment.153 Instead, continued violations serve only to record a 
defendant’s position in the statutory scheme; if this is only the first or 
second violation hearing then Proposition 36 probation will be continued. 
The court’s safety and comfort in interpreting and conforming to the 
letter of the Act leads to a virtually ignored amenability clause and the 
spirit of the voter initiative is lost in the narrow interpretation of the 
statutory language. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Despite their statutorily compliant interpretation, California courts’ 
analyses remain piecemeal, as they overlook amenability. The lack of 
willingness to find defendants unamenable is evident in the statistic that 
over one in five defendants (23.1%) had their probation revoked in the 
third year of the Act’s existence.154 With that many defendants being 
guilty of at least three drug-related violations of probation or guilty of 
non-drug-related violations (as those are the necessary elements to 
probation being revoked) in only three years, obviously participant 
amenability is a necessary element of Proposition 36. A discussion of 
amenability would allow courts to enforce a level of accountability 
amongst offenders and thereby focus on assisting those offenders who 
want to reform but need a program that includes unattractive 
consequences (such as revocation of probation or even jail time) to 
 153. The issue is not whether or not offenders should be allowed to relapse in their treatment 
and violate their probation; more often than not that will happen because drug offenders often falter 
in their road to recovery. See discussion supra Part III.B. See also discussion supra Part IV.A. The 
courts’ understanding of the difficulty in overcoming drug use is evidenced by their willingness to 
work with repeat offenders: 
[o]ffenders with three SACPA violations were often allowed to return to treatment or 
were sent to a halfway house rather than facing incarceration. In short, the courts tried to 
exhaust as many options as possible before determining that an offender was not 
amenable to treatment. Participants in one county reported developing a special drug 
court for the small number of offenders violated out of SACPA. 
UCLA REPORT 2002, supra note 117, at 83. 
The issue is what to do with offenders unmotivated to change or get better. SACPA recognized that 
drug users might be unmotivated to even take advantage of their Proposition 36 eligibility, however 
the issue of continuing motivation once an offender is already “in the system” has yet to be 
addressed or evaluated. Regarding “unmotivated clients”: 
Early in the SACPA implementation process, lead agency staff in one focus county 
planned to meet the challenge of serving large numbers of unmotivated clients by 
assessing motivation for treatment and developing pre-treatment care for unmotivated 
clients. Treatment providers in this county were experimenting with treatment approaches 
such as motivational interviewing. 
UCLA REPORT 2002, supra note 117, at 152. 
 154. UCLA REPORT 2004, supra note 123, at v. 
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motivate them. Given that a court recently enjoined attempts to amend 
Proposition 36 to include short periods of incarceration as a motivator, it 
is especially pertinent now that amenability be addressed. If reforms 
cannot be made by the legislature then the public becomes dependent 
upon the courts to make Proposition 36 applicable to those persons the 
voters intended. 
The apparent intent of Proposition 36 is broad enough that Taylor, 
Dagostino and like courts are left to themselves to determine what 
elements of drug rehabilitation the voters truly intended to focus on. Did 
the electorate just intend to get and keep as many minor drug violators as 
possible out of jail in order to save money and avoid superfluous 
punishment, or did they truly mean to rehabilitate drug-offenders looking 
for a second chance and willing to clean-up and become healthy, 
productive members of society? Do California voters care about an 
offender’s willingness to be successful (as implied by “amenability”) or 
is the point to simply offer a chance to offenders and let them “falter” as 
they will? 
Perhaps the courts are merely keeping in line with precedent, wary 
about creating new law through any interpretation of amenability. This is 
an understandable stance, especially given that the number of probation 
violation hearings appears widely held to be an all-encompassing 
indicator of a defendant’s eligibility for Proposition 36. Nevertheless, in 
the end it is unlikely that voters intended to enact legislation that offered 
an alternative to jail to minor drug-offenders only to have those offenders 
take a free ride through the system—stalling jail time for as long as they 
are statutorily permitted before eventually being sent to jail having never 
been forced to make any real effort to get better. The annual reports 
evaluating Proposition 36 do indicate that Californians are saving money 
and some offenders are successfully completing treatment, however by 
and large the results show that a significant number of defendants are 
failing to take advantage of their opportunity to be treated and stay out of 
jail. What is needed is accountability. 
California’s failure to achieve accountability through S.B. 1137 
leaves drug-offenders in a system that merely walks them through an 
inevitable process of repeated violations and hearings with no real 
motivation to stay drug free; there are no consequences for repeated 
violations so offenders feel no need to change their behavior. 
Amenability is needed to distinguish between those drug-offenders who 
simply slip periodically in their road to recovery and those who have 
never been motivated to change and are merely taking advantage of a 
way to avoid prison a little longer. Until courts are willing to find a 
repeat drug violator unamenable to treatment, the intent of voters to 
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improve the health and safety of society while keeping costs down and 
jails free of minor offenders will never be realized. 
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